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DRONES AND CIVILIANS:
EMERGING EVIDENCE OF THE
TERRORIZING EFFECTS OF THE
U.S. DRONE PROGRAMS
By Patrick J. Keenan*
Abstract
The Biden Administration, in one of its first consequential foreign policy decisions,
announced that it would undertake a comprehensive review of the United States drone
program. Officials promised that this review would consider all available evidence. This
article shows that the U.S. drone program violates international law because of the ways it
terrorizes civilian populations. U.S. officials from both parties have argued that drones are
an effective part of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy. However, effectiveness is not the
legal standard. The law requires that the program not unduly harm civilians. For as long
as the U.S. has been using drones, communities in targeted countries have contended that
the U.S. kills innocent civilians. The U.S. has typically minimized these claims, even as it
has acknowledged some of the deaths. Until recently, this was the state of the argument:
the U.S. argued that the drone program was effective, with minimal effects on civilians,
while others argued that it caused undue harm to innocent civilians. Neither side found the
evidence cited by the other side credible or gave much credence to the other side’s
arguments.
There is now a growing body of empirical evidence that shows how the U.S. drone
program terrorizes civilians in ways that violate the law. Drawing on research from
several disciplines, I show the ways the drone program affects the targeted population,
civilian and militants alike. The evidence shows that even if drone strikes kill terrorist
leaders—strikes the U.S. would consider successful—militants shift their attacks from
military targets to civilians. The evidence also shows that the main reason militant violence
goes down is not the strikes themselves, but the monitoring and surveillance apparatus
associated with the drone program. Areas in which the U.S. maintains an active drone
strike program are typically under persistent surveillance and monitoring.
Communications are monitored, movements are tracked by surveillance drones, and
intelligence-gathering operations are ongoing. Civilians are terrorized by these practices.
Taken together, this evidence shows that U.S. operations violate international law because
they are indiscriminate: they affect civilians and militants alike, with little effort made to
reduce civilian harms.

Professor of Law & Heidi Hurd Faculty Scholar, University of Illinois College
of Law.
*
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INTRODUCTION
Does the United States drone program terrorize civilians to the degree
that it violates international law? This is one of the most important questions
the Biden Administration must answer as it faces one of its first consequential
foreign policy decisions. Emerging evidence suggests that the answer is yes.
The Biden Administration has promised to undertake a long-overdue
assessment of U.S. targeting policies and practices. 1 But even as it undertakes
this review, the U.S. continues to use drone strikes as part of its
counterterrorism efforts.2 The U.S. drone program is one of the most divisive
aspects of U.S. counterterrorism policy.3 Drones are used for many purposes
in many places, but most controversial is when they are used to launch missile

1

See Charlie Savage & Eric Schmitt, Biden Secretly Limits Counterterrorism
Drone Strikes Away from War Zones, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2021) (describing
Biden Administration’s decision to modify Trump Administration policies on the
use of drones and kill/capture raids against terrorism suspects).
2
See Eric Schmitt & Declan Walsh, U.S. Military Conducts a Drone Strike Against
Shabab Fighters in Somalia, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2021) (reporting on a U.S.
drone attack against Shabab forces fighting in Somalia); Eric Schmitt, U.S. Carries
Out Airstrikes in Iraq and Syria, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2021) (reporting on U.S.
drone attacks against Iranian-backed militants in Iraq and Syria).
3
For a sample of the controversies associated with the U.S. drone program, see
generally Philip Alston (Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or
Arbitrary Executions), Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary
or Arbitrary Executions, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010)
(describing U.S. drone program and arguing that it violates international law in
many instances); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE HIDDEN US WAR IN SOMALIA:
CIVILIAN CASUALTIES FROM AIR STRIKES IN LOWER SHABELLE (2019)
(describing effect on civilians of U.S. drone strikes in Somalia); Connor
Friedersdorf, Obama's Weak Defense of His Record on Drone Killings, THE
ATLANTIC (Dec. 23, 2016) (arguing that U.S. drone strike casualty data regularly
undercount civilian casualties); Scott Shane, Drone Strikes Reveal Uncomfortable
Truth: U.S. is Often Unsure About Who Will Die, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2015)
(arguing that the U.S. has little accurate data on civilian effects of drone strikes);
Salman Masood & Ihsanullah Tipu Mehsud, Thousands in Pakistan Protest
American Drone Strikes, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2013) (reporting on protests in
Pakistan against U.S. drone strikes on Pakistani territory); Leila Nadya Sadat,
America's Drone Wars, 45 CASE WESTERN RES. J. INT'L L. 215 (2012) (arguing
that the U.S. drone and targeted killing program has not complied with
international law).
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strikes against suspected terrorists or their supporters. 4 Only slightly less
contentious is the U.S. policy of launching kill-capture raids against militants,
when U.S. forces attempt to capture or kill militants. U.S. policymakers have
long argued that drones are an essential component of any counterterrorism
strategy.5 Although there are significant differences in execution, these two
types of direct action against terrorist targets are largely governed by the same
legal and policy framework.6
Scholars and policymakers have long debated whether U.S. drone
policies and practices violate international law, including legal rules requiring
combatants to minimize civilian casualties and the impact of armed conflict

4

Although it has become common to use the phrase "drone strike," see, e.g. Eric
Schmitt, American Drone Strike in Libya Kills Top Qaeda Recruiter, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 28, 2018), drones themselves are unmanned aerial vehicles used as a
platform from which to launch a missile. See Drones: What are They and How do
They Work?, BBC NEWS (Jan. 31, 2012) (describing types of missiles carried by
and launched from drones). In addition, drones are used for a variety of other
purposes. They carry a range of surveillance and monitoring equipment, for
example. Id. (describing the "wealth of sensors in" drones, including "colour and
black-and-white TV cameras, image intensifiers, radar, infra-red imaging for lowlight conditions and lasers for targeting"). For a fuller examination of the various
uses of drones for the U.S. military, see generally Jacqueline L. Hazelton, Drones:
What are They Good For?, 43 PARAMETERS 29 (2013) (describing military's many
uses of drones). In this Article, I use interchangeably the term "drone strikes" and
"missile strikes" to mean missiles launched from unmanned aerial vehicles.
5
Drones are praised by some policymakers as providing "laser-like precision that
can excise that terrorist or that threat" similar to the way that surgeon can excise
infected tissue in a way "that will not damage he surrounding tissue." John
Brennan, The Efficacy and Ethics of U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy, Wilson
Center (Apr. 30, 2012) (https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-efficacy-andethics-us-counterterrorism-strategy). Indeed, some scholars have argued that,
because of their precision, military may be obligated under the law of armed
conflict to use drones. See generally Oren Gross, The New Way of War: Is There a
Duty to Use Drones?, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1 (2016) (arguing that there may be, under
some conditions, an obligation to use drones instead of other available weapons or
techniques).
6
See, e.g. Jo Becker & Scott Shane, Secret "Kill List" Proves a Test of Obama's
Principles and Will, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2012) (describing U.S. counterterrorism
operation targeting procedures); Greg Miller, Plan for Hunting Terrorists Signals
U.S. Intends to Keep Adding Names to Kill Lists, WASH. POST (Oct. 23, 2012)
(describing U.S. officials' work to formalize rules by which people are placed on
lists to be targeted by raids or missiles).
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on civilians.7 As the Biden Administration undertakes its promised policy
review—one that it has pledged will be based on the best available
evidence—it is an appropriate time to examine a small but growing body of
scholarship about the civilian effects of drone strikes.8 In this Article, I argue
that this evidence raises serious questions about whether the U.S. drone
program complies with the international law of armed conflict. The U.S. has
repeatedly stated that it fully complies with the law of armed conflict in its
counterterrorism operations.9 This means, among other things, that the U.S.
must do all that it is able to minimize the effects of these operations on
civilians.10 There have long been reports of civilian casualties caused by U.S.

7

See generally Waseem Ahmad Qureshi, The Legality and Conduct of Drone
Attacks, 7 NOTRE DAME J. INT. & COMP. L. 91 (2017) (analyzing legality of drone
strikes against terrorist suspects); Michael D. Shear & Scott Shane, Congress to
See Memo Backing Drone Attacks on Americans, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6,2013)
(describing debate among policymakers regarding drone targeting policies); Sadat,
supra note 3 (describing debates about whether U.S. drone and targeted killing
program complies with international law).
8
See Charlie Savage, Trump’s Secret Rules for Drone Strikes Outside War Zones
Are Disclosed, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2021 (describing Biden Administration's
planned review of drone targeting policies).
9
See Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, The Obama
Administration and International Law, Address at Annual Meeting of the Am.
Society of Int’l L. (March 25, 2010), https://20092017.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm (describing U.S. policy of
complying with the international law of armed conflict); Brian Egan, Legal
Adviser, U.S. Department of State, International Law, Legal Diplomacy, and the
Counter-ISIL Campaign, Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Society
for International Law (Apr. 1, 2016), https://20092017.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/255493.htm (same); Paul C. Ney, General
Counsel, U.S. Department of Defense, Legal Considerations Related to the U.S.
Air Strike Against Qassem Soleimani, Address at B.Y.U Law School (Mar. 4,
2020), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6808252/DOD-GC-SpeechBYU-QS.pdf (same).
10
See, e.g. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW RULES DATABASE, Rule 15 ("In the conduct of military
operations, constant care must be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians
and civilian objects. All feasible precautions must be taken to avoid, and in any
event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to
civilian objects."), https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customaryihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule15.
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operations.11
The new evidence that I highlight in this Article shows that the
harmful effects on civilian populations are more significant and more
predictable than U.S. policymakers have acknowledged so far. This emerging
evidence illuminates many aspects of the effects of the U.S. drone program,
but two issues are particularly salient. First, there is evidence that attacks by
militants against civilians go up after a drone strike that kills a militant
leader.12 This means that civilians suffer more violence after a drone strike—
even a "successful" strike that does not otherwise harm civilians—than was
the case before the strike. Second, there is evidence that most of the effects
of the drone program are not from missile strikes but from the persistent
surveillance and monitoring that are also part of the program. 13 Attacks by
militants against civilians are reduced mostly due to the changes that militants
make in response to surveillance, monitoring, and the threat of drone
strikes.14 Importantly, civilians feel these effects as well. Their lives are
similarly monitored, which damages their mental health, livelihoods, and
communities. These findings, which are beginning to emerge in recent
11

There are no agreed-upon statistics on civilian casualties, but there are several
credible sources of this information. For example, the Bureau of Investigative
Journalism maintains a comprehensive database of casualties caused by drone
strikes in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen. See THE BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM, DRONE DATABASE,
https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/projects/drone-war; The New America
Foundation maintains a similar database. See Peter Bergen, David Sterman &
Melissa Salyk-Virk, America's Counterterrorism Wars,
https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/reports/americascounterterrorism-wars/; As of Apr. 2021, the Bureau of Investigative Journalism's
database showed that there were between 4126-10,076 deaths from drone strikes in
Afghanistan, 2515-4026 deaths in Pakistan, 1197-1410 in Somalia, and 1020-1389
in Yemen. THE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM, DRONE DATABASE,
https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/projects/drone-war.
12
See Max Abrahms & Philip B.K. Potter, Explaining Terrorism: Leadership
Deficits and Militant Group Tactics, 69 INT'L ORG. 311, 331 (2015) (describing
finding that militant violence against civilians increased after a strike deemed
successful because it killed a militant leader).
13
See Asfandyar Mir & Dylan Moore, Drones, Surveillance, and Violence:
Theory and Evidence from a U.S. Drone Program, 63 INT'L STUD. QUARTERLY
846, 847 (2019) (reporting their finding that "nearly 75 percent of the violence
reduction is associated with the drone program period without airstrikes and about
25 percent is associated with aggregated effects of individual strikes").
14
Id. at 847 (describing anticipatory effects associated with the drone program,
including decreased movement and other behavior changes).
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scholarly research, suggest that U.S. operations are harming civilians in ways
that are predictable and in violation of the international laws of armed conflict
that the U.S. has pledged to respect. As the Biden Administration evaluates
the drone program and draws up new rules, this evidence should be a crucial
part of its assessment.
My argument proceeds in three main parts. In Part I, I analyze the law
and policy framework governing U.S. direct actions against suspected
terrorists. This matters because this is the legal standard to which the U.S.
must be held. In Parts II and III, I analyze recent evidence regarding the
harmful effects of the U.S. drone program on affected communities that has
been largely absent from the debate over U.S. actions. In Part II, I summarize
the findings that show how drone strikes could be considered "effective."
In Part III, I present the evidence most important to my argument that
the U.S. program may well have violated the international law of armed
conflict. The evidence suggests that after strikes that kill their leaders,
militants appear to shift their violence from military or government targets to
civilians.15 And the evidence suggests that the main reason that militant
violence goes down is not the strikes themselves but the monitoring and
surveillance apparatus associated with the drone program. 16 Civilians are
deeply affected by these practices. Their lives are disrupted by the persistent
surveillance, the observation of their movements, and the risk that their
innocent movements—such as using a flashlight at night to attend to
agricultural fields—will lead to them being targeted with a missile. Taken
together, these studies suggest that the U.S. is not complying with the laws
of armed conflict. Its operations are indiscriminate: they affect civilians and
militants alike, with little effort made to reduce civilian harms. And the
effects on civilians are not proportionate to the military advantages gained by
the operations.
Before moving on, two important caveats are in order. First, much of
the information about the U.S. government's counterterrorism actions comes
from news reports, leaks from whistleblowers, or reports from advocates. 17
15

See discussion infra Sections II.C and III.
See discussion infra Sections IV.A & B.
17
See, e.g. Mark Mazzetti & Michael Schmidt, Ex-Worker at C.I.A. Says He
Leaked Data on Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2013). For a catalogue of the
various revelations that came from material leaked by Snowden, see Lawfare,
Snowden Revelations, https://www.lawfareblog.com/snowden-revelations; Jeremy
Scahill, The Assassination Complex, THE INTERCEPT (Oct. 15, 2015),
https://theintercept.com/drone-papers/the-assassination-complex/ (describing
16
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News reports are not in every case the ideal source of evidence about ongoing
government programs, but I rely on this information because it is the best
available. In addition, throughout this Article, I note when appropriate if the
news reports are contested or if there are reasons to suspect that they are
inaccurate or incomplete. The second caveat is that the available evidence
does not permit causal claims on what the central issues are for me: how the
U.S. drone program affects civilian populations and whether it complies with
the international law of armed conflict. Any analysis of the relationship
between drone strikes and other direct counterterrorism actions and their
effects on either civilians or on future terrorist actions must acknowledge this
issue. Nonetheless, it is instructive to examine the available evidence to
identify any useful patterns.
I.

LAW AND POLICY GOVERNING U.S. DIRECT ACTIONS AGAINST
TERRORIST TARGETS

The U.S. asserts that it complies with the relevant international law of
armed conflict in its counterterrorism operations. The law of armed conflict
imposes responsibilities and places limitations on combatants in their
operations. This is relevant to my argument because it supports the contention
that all parties to a conflict bear responsibility for gathering as much
information as possible about the effects of their actions on non-combatants;
it is not permissible for combatants to ignore evidence of the effects of their
past operations as they shape policy. Operations with the predictable and
documented effect of terrorizing the civilian population are illegal. Parties
may not rely on the excuse that they did not know of the consequences of
their practices when the lack of knowledge was caused by a failure to consider
available evidence. Parties may not rely on their opponent's misdeeds to
excuse their own; those who put their own citizens at risk may be at fault
even if the attacker is also at fault. This supports the argument that is
developed fully in Part II: the U.S. must, to comply with the laws of armed
conflict, consider the predictable, known consequences of its airstrikes. When
the U.S. targets militants who live among civilians, those airstrikes have
profound, demonstrable effects on civilians. To ignore those effects is to
violate international law.
The U.S. has long maintained that it complies with the laws of war
with respect to its fight against al Qaeda, ISIS, and other terrorist
organizations.18 More specifically, the U.S. argues that because the opposing
leaked documents revealing process by which terrorist suspects are targeted).
18
See, e.g., Koh, supra note 9 (stating that the U.S. complies with relevant laws of
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forces are non-state actors, it is engaged in a non-international armed
conflict.19 This body of law imposes a set of principles that affect the
targeting decisions that belligerents make.20 The purpose of the principles is
to minimize the effects of armed conflict on civilian populations and ensure
that belligerents engage each other militarily rather than attempt to win the
conflict by other means, such as engaging in ethnic cleansing or terrorizing
the local populace.21 Importantly, the U.S. argues that it is engaged in a noninternational armed conflict everywhere in the world, not just in those
geographic areas in which there are currently kinetic military operations. 22
This means that the U.S. argues that it is legally entitled to use wartime
targeting rules anywhere in the world it wishes (assuming that the other
criteria for using force are met), even if there is no armed conflict in that
geographic area at that time.23 This stands in contrast to the traditional
understanding of the law of armed conflict, which holds that human rights
standards govern law enforcement and security personnel outside areas of

armed conflict in its counterterrorism operations).
19
See Egan, supra note 9 (describing U.S. legal position that it complies with the
law of armed conflict in its counterterrorism operations).
20
See Steven Haines, The Developing Law of Weapons: Humanity, Distinction,
and Precautions in Attack, OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INT’L L. IN ARMED CONFLICT
273, 282-290 (Andrew Chapham & Paola Gaeta, eds., 2014) (describing the
principles that regulate targeting decisions in armed conflict, including the
requirement that belligerents take every effort to distinguish between combatants
and non-combatants in order to minimize the impact of conflict on noncombatants).
21
See Andrea Bianchi & Yasmin Naqvi, Terrorism, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INT’L L. IN ARMED CONFLICT 574, 579-586 (Andrew Chapham & Paola Gaeta, eds.,
2014) (describing legal prohibition of attacks aimed at terrorizing the population in
times of armed conflict).
22
See Jennifer C. Daskal, The Geography of the Battlefield: A Framework for
Detention and Targeting Outside the Hot Conflict Zone, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1165,
1176-1181 (2013) (describing U.S. position that there are no legal limits on the
geography of armed conflict with terrorist organizations).
23
See John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Sec. and
Counterterrorism, Remarks at the Program on Law and Security at Harvard Law
School: Strengthening Our Security by Adhering to Our Values and Laws (Sept.
16, 2011), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2011/09/16/remarks-john-o-brennan-strengthening-our-security-adheringour-values-an (arguing that the U.S. does not view its "authority to use military
force" against terrorist organizations as being "restricted solely to 'hot' battlefields
like Afghanistan" but also extending to wherever belligerent forces are located).
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active armed conflict.24 On the traditional view, for example, where there is
no armed conflict, belligerents must arrest opposing forces rather than simply
detain or attack them.25
Partly in response to its position that the war on terror has no
geographic limits, the U.S. has created an additional layer of restraints that
apply outside of "areas of active hostilities."26 Put differently, in areas that
would not fall within the traditional definition of armed conflict, the U.S. has
vowed to apply limits by policy even as it rejects legal limits. In addition to
these restrictions required by the law of armed conflict, the U.S. has imposed
on itself a policy framework ostensibly designed to further minimize the
effects on civilians of its counter-terrorist operations.27 These policies, put in
force through executive orders and orders from the Secretary of Defense,
purport to require the U.S. military to launch lethal direct actions only after a
24

See Daskal, supra note 23, at 1187-1192 (describing legal view that there are
territorial limits on armed conflict which restrict the geographic areas in which
belligerents may apply the laws of armed conflict). This is different from areas
outside of the geographic boundaries of armed conflict under the conventional
understanding of international law. There belligerents are required to comply with
human rights-based law enforcement rules. See Hans-Joachim Heintze, On the
Relationship Between Human Rights Law Protection and International
Humanitarian Law, 86 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 789, 789-790 (2004) (describing
traditional understanding of role of human rights law and the law of armed
conflict). Thus, under the traditional understanding of international the default rule
is that human rights standards apply everywhere and the law of armed conflict only
applies where and when there is an armed conflict. See Philip Alston (Special
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions), ¶¶ 28-33 U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010). In contrast, the U.S. position in in
counterterrorism operations is that the default rule is that the law of armed conflict
applies everywhere.
25
For a fuller discussion of relationship between international humanitarian law
and international human rights law, including the boundaries and overlap, see
Derek Jinks, International Human Rights Law in Time of Armed Conflict, in
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INT’L L. IN ARMED CONFLICT 656, 662-665 (Andrew
Chapham & Paola Gaeta, eds., 2014).
26
See WHITE HOUSE, PROCEDURES FOR APPROVING DIRECT ACTION AGAINST
TERRORIST TARGETS LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES AND AREAS OF
ACTIVE HOSTILITIES (May 22, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/oip/foialibrary/procedures_for_approving_direct_action_against_terrorist_targets/downloa
d.
27
See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., LAW OF WAR MANUAL 62-65 (2016) (describing
precautions required by U.S. military designed to minimize effects of armed
conflict on civilian populations).
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thorough review of the appropriateness of the target and the alternatives to
lethal direct action. 28
In this part, I first describe the traditional understanding of the laws
and policies governing targeting decisions. I then describe and analyze U.S.
policies that govern U.S. actions outside areas of active hostilities. Finally, I
show how these laws and policies are implemented in practice. This helps to
set up the discussion in Part II on the effects of drone strikes on civilian
populations. These impacts are important for many reasons, of course. First
among them is whether current U.S. policy, including a deeper understanding
of its consequences, is consistent with domestic and international law. Thus,
a thorough examination of the legal regime is necessary. Also important, of
course, is that U.S. policies affect the lives of real people who must live with
the consequences both of alleged terrorists living in their midst and with
efforts to attack those terrorists. Finally, it is important to analyze whether
the use of drone strikes against terrorist targets is effective as a policy.
A. The Law Governing Direct Actions Against Terrorist
Targets
Direction action against terrorist targets is governed by three distinct
legal regimes: the domestic and international law rules for the use of force,
the law of armed conflict principles governing the way force may be used,
and U.S. policy that purports to implement these rules. 29 In this part, I
28

See generally ANDREW COCKBURN, KILL CHAIN: THE RISE OF THE HIGH-TECH
ASSASSINS (2015) (describing the processes that govern the U.S. targeting
process); see also Richard Murphy & Afsheen John Radsan, Due Process and
Targeted Killing of Terrorists, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 405, 422-437 (2009)
(describing and analyzing the U.S. due process arguments regarding terrorism
targeting decisions).
29
For an excellent overview of the various sources of law relevant to the U.S.
drone program, see Legality of Targeted Killing Program Under International
Law, LAWFARE, https://www.lawfareblog.com/legality-targeted-killing-programunder-international-law; see also Legality of U.S. Government's Targeted Killing
Program Under Domestic Law, LAWFARE, https://www.lawfareblog.com/legalityus-governments-targeted-killing-program-under-domestic-law. In this Article I
focus on U.S. law and policy because the U.S. is the dominant actor in
counterterrorism operations, but that focus should not obscure the fact that U.S.
legal claims are contested. This is particularly true with respect to targeted killings.
For example, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary
Executions submitted a report to the Human Rights Council in which he presented
a distinctly different view of existing international law. See Philip Aston (Special
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions), supra note 3. The
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examine these various legal rules. First, I analyze the ways that U.S. and
international law regulates the use of drones, or other force, against terrorist
targets. There are a number of legal bases for these actions, and I focus on
those most relevant to my argument. Next, I examine the international law of
armed conflict, which also regulates U.S. practices. Taken together, these two
bodies of law are the rules against which U.S. practices must be measured.
i. Domestic Legal Bases for the Use of Direct Action Against
Terrorist Targets
The U.S. has consistently argued that the 2001 Authorization for the
Use of Military Force (2001 AUMF),30 provides an adequate legal basis for
the U.S. to attack terrorist targets.31 The 2001 AUMF authorizes the President
"to use all necessary and appropriate force" against those persons, states, and
organizations that were involved in the attacks of September 11, 2001. 32 The
2001 AUMF has been used to justify a wide range of actions since it was
enacted, including the war in Afghanistan and attacks against individual
terrorists.33 In addition, the U.S. has argued that the President has
independent authority, under Article II of the Constitution, as commander-inchief of the U.S. military to use force to protect the U.S. 34 The U.S. argues
that many of its counterterrorism operations are also authorized by the
inherent right of self-defense recognized in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. 35
Finally, Executive Order 12,33336 regulates the U.S. legal position. Executive
Order 12,333 bans persons acting on behalf of the U.S. from committing or
assisting others to commit assassinations.37 As an executive order, it amounts

Special Rapporteur argued that targeted killings may amount to unlawful
assassinations in many circumstances, especially when drones are used. See, e.g.,
id. ¶ 53, 79-84.
30
Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat.
224 (2001).
31
See Koh, supra note 9; See also Egan, supra note 9.
32
See supra note 30.
33
See CONG’L RES. SERV., PRESIDENTIAL REFERENCES TO THE 2001
AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE IN PUBLICLY AVAILABLE
EXECUTIVE ACTIONS AND REPORTS TO CONGRESS (Feb. 16, 2018) (detailing all
U.S. government actions for which the 2001 AUMF was the cited authority).
34
See U.S. CONST. art. II.
35
See Egan, supra note 9.
36
United States Intelligence Activities, Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. § 200
(1981) (Dec. 4, 1981).
37
Supra note 36, § 2.11.
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to a self-imposed but legally binding limitation on the President's actions. 38
The U.S. has argued that the assassination ban does not prohibit targeted
killings so long as they are part of an armed conflict and are done in a way
that is consistent with the law of armed conflict. 39
Taken together, these sources provide the domestic legal basis for
U.S. counterterrorism direct actions. The U.S. has consistently argued that all
of its actions have been consistent with, and indeed must be consistent with,
the relevant legal authorities.40 As stated, this is important because it provides
the legal template against which U.S. counterterrorism operations must be
evaluated.
ii. The International Law of Armed Conflict
The law of armed conflict has deep roots in international law.41 The
modern law of armed conflict, based in large measure on treaties signed in
the Hague and Geneva, comprises principles that govern the conduct of
belligerents.42 The first principle is that parties in an armed conflict must take
effective measures to distinguish between legitimate military targets and
civilian targets, the latter must not be targeted. 43 In practice, complying with
the principle of distinction can mean several things. For example, it can mean
providing some level of warning to civilians before an attack on an area in
which civilians are known to be sheltering.44 Another important limitation
associated with the principle of distinction is the ban on indiscriminate
attacks.45 These are attacks that make it impossible to distinguish between

38

See VIVIAN S. CHU & TODD GARVEY, CONG'L RES. SERV., RS2084, Executive
Orders: Issuance, Modification, and Revocation 7-8 (Apr. 16, 2014) (describing
ability of president to revoke or modify executive orders).
39
See Koh, supra note 9.
40
See Egan, supra note 9.
41
See, e.g., DAVID BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ANTIQUITY 208 (2006)
(arguing that “there is enough evidence to suggest that there were certain rules of
conduct in warfare that were consistently observed by ancient States”).
42
See WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, THE LAW OF TARGETING 35-40 (2012) (describing
the origins of the legal rules that govern armed conflict).
43
See id. at 60-62 (describing content of the principle of distinction, requiring
belligerents to make "a distinction … throughout the conflict between those who
may be lawfully attacked and those who must be respected and protected").
44
Id. at 234-235.
45
See id. at 60-73 (defining indiscriminate weapons and describing legal
prohibition against using such weapons).
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legitimate and illegitimate targets.46 For example, certain weapons such as
nuclear weapons are by their very nature indiscriminate and therefore may be
prohibited in many circumstances. 47 And belligerents must take special care
with targets shared by civilians and combatants alike, making it difficult for
belligerents to be certain that they are actually attacking legitimate targets. 48
The principle of proportionality requires belligerents to use a level of
force that is proportional to the expected military objective.49 As with the
principle of distinction, this principle is an important limitation on
belligerents in armed conflict. Commanders must use the least destructive
means available that can accomplish the military's legitimate goals. 50 This
calculation will, of course, depend on the information available at the time,
the commander's calculation of the expected military advantage, and the
commander's assessment of the risk of civilian casualties. 51
The principle of necessity operates as a kind of permission for
armed forces to use those measures necessary to defeat the enemy militarily.52
It does not grant permission to use any means available. Instead, it specifies
that the sole legitimate military purpose is to damage the military or military

46

WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, WEAPONS AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 60 (2d
ed. 2016) (noting that the law of armed conflict requires that all weapons "be
capable of adequate control both as to the place of its impact and the nature and
extent of its effects").
47
See Stefan Oeter, Methods and Means of Combat, in HANDBOOK OF
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 105, 138-42 (Dieter Fleck ed., 1995)
(describing regulation of nuclear weapons under law of armed conflict principles).
48
Id. at 194-97 (describing legal requirements for targeting and protecting dual-use
objects and facilities).
49
See id. at 111-16 (defining principle of proportionality).
50
See William J. Fenrick, The Rule of Proportionality and Protocol in
Conventional Warfare, 98 MIL. L. REV. 91, 96-98 (1982) (describing the legal
bases and contours of the principle of proportionality).
51
See BOOTHBY, supra note 47, at 475-80 (describing targeting processes and
calculations that commanders must undertake to comply with the law of armed
conflict).
52
Geoffrey S. Corn, Filling the Void: Providing a Framework for the Legal
Regulation of the Military Component of the War on Terror through Application of
Basic Principles of the Law of Armed Conflict, 12 ILSA J. INT'L & COMPAR. L.
481, 483-84 (2006) (defining and analyzing various interpretations of the principle
of military necessity).
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capacity of opposing forces.53 In accordance with this principle, military
objectives are those that make an effective contribution to the opposing
military and whose destruction would result in a military advantage to the
attacking force.54
In operation as a coherent whole, compliance with the laws of armed
conflict sets the minimum standards on a state's actions in several ways. First,
the law of armed conflict requires belligerents to explicitly consider the risks
of civilian casualties in all of their operations.55 Belligerents are not required
to ensure that there is absolutely no risk of civilian casualties. Instead, they
typically must undertake two calculations. One is whether the operation's
planners have done enough to ensure that appropriate measures have been
taken to avoid civilian casualties to the extent possible. 56 Another is to
determine whether, despite the steps taken, the risk of civilian casualties is
outweighed by the expected military advantage to be gained in the
operation.57 Second, the law of armed conflict means that belligerents must
attempt to defeat their opponents militarily and not by some other means.
Pursuant to the principle of necessity, the law's permission to use violence
extends only to those objects (and persons) whose destruction will damage
the opposing force's military capacity.58 Thus, for example, the law limits the
targeting of civilian faith or cultural leaders whose removal might demoralize
the opponent. The law prohibits the use of techniques whose effects are

53

Christopher Greenwood, Historical Development and Legal Bases, in
HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 1, 30-33, (Dieter
Fleck ed.,1995) (describing the principle of military necessity, including its limits).
54
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, Protocol I, Art.
52(2) (limiting attacks to "those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or
use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial
destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers
a definite military advantage").
55
See BOOTHBY, supra note 42, at 60-62 (describing rules governing targeting and
protection of civilians).
56
See, e.g., UNITED STATES ARMY, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of
Land Warfare 2-52019)(stating that the law of armed conflict requires those
planning military operations to consider in advance the risks posed to civilian
populations).
57
Greenwood, supra note 53, at 30-33 (describing requirement that commanders
comply with the principle of military necessity).
58
Greenwood, supra note 53, at 30-33 (describing the contours of the principle of
necessity).
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experienced equally by combatants and civilians.59
In addition to these bedrock principles, there are three additional
issues that are relevant to my argument. First, both the attacker and the
defender must comply with international humanitarian law. 60 The attacker's
obligation is clearly understood. But the defender's obligation is based on the
same logic as the attacker's obligation. All parties in armed conflict have a
legal obligation to minimize the effect of the conflict on non-combatants. 61
This requirement, for example, would prohibit belligerents from deliberately
putting non-combatants in harm's way. The second additional issue is that the
law requires those engaged in armed conflict base their decisions on good
information. Compliance with the principle of distinction can mean that
belligerents must base their targeting decisions on reliable information, and
that relying on a flawed intelligence-gathering process might amount to a
violation of the principle. For example, commanders who base their targeting
systems on faulty intelligence or unreliable intelligence-gathering processes
may be violating the principle of distinction.62 Finally, and perhaps
obviously, the principle of distinction also prohibits the use of any uses of
violence whose primary purpose is to spread terror among the civilian
population.63 This includes not just "direct attacks against civilians" but also
"may include indiscriminate or disproportionate attacks." 64 And the harms
from these attacks may include the "extensive trauma and psychological

59

Greenwood, supra note 53, at 30-33 (noting that the law of armed conflict does
not permit inflicting undue harm on civilians simply because it would provide a
military advantage).
60
See Michael N. Schmitt, Human Shields in International Humanitarian Law, 47
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 292, 301-22 (2009) (describing legal obligations of
defenders—those being attacked—with respect to the principle of distinction).
61
Nils Melzer, The Principle of Distinction Between Civilians and Combatant, in
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INT’L L. IN ARMED CONFLICT (Andrew Clapham & Paola
Gaeta eds., 2014) (arguing that the "primary aim of … international humanitarian
law … is to protect the victims of armed conflict").
62
See, e.g., John J. Merriam, Affirmative Target Identification: Operationalizing
the Principle of Distinction for U.S. Warfighters, 56 VA. J. INT'L L. 83, 118-21
(2016) (describing requirement of reliable intelligence in compliance with the
principle of distinction).
63
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, Protocol II, Art.
13(2).
64
Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No.: IT-98-29-A, Appeal Judgment ¶ 102 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Nov. 30, 2006).
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damage" that comes from living in a state of constant threat of attack. 65
The U.S. position on many of these issues is different from the
traditional understanding of international law. Traditionally, an armed
conflict existed in a specific and identifiable geographic area, and it was only
in that area that forces were permitted to use the looser targeting rules under
the laws of armed conflict.66 Belligerents in an armed conflict can kill
opposing forces with no warning (assuming they comply with other
provisions of the law).67 They can seize the enemy without probable cause
and detain them without trial. Outside of an armed conflict, these actions
would amount to significant violations of important rights. Thus the U.S.
position is important because it purports to justify actions that would not
otherwise be consistent with foundational principles of international law.
B.

The U.S. Policy Framework

In addition to its pledge to comply with the laws of armed conflict,
the U.S. government has created a series of policies that further regulate its
counterterrorism operations.68 There are, of course, many policies that affect
65

Id.
See Daskal, supra note 22, at 1174-76 (contrasting traditional territorial
understanding of armed conflict with U.S. position, including associated
limitations on the types of actions permitted under each regime). This stands in
contrast to areas outside of the geographic boundaries of armed conflict. There
belligerents are required to comply with human rights-based law enforcement
rules. See Hans-Joachim Heintze, On the Relationship Between Human Rights Law
Protection and International Humanitarian Law, 86 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 789,
789-90 (2004) (describing traditional understanding of role of human rights law
and the law of armed conflict). Thus, under the traditional understanding of
international the default rule is that human rights standards apply everywhere and
the law of armed conflict only applies where and when there is an armed conflict.
See Philip Alston (Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary
Executions), ¶¶ 28-33 U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010). In contrast,
the U.S. position in in counterterrorism operations is that the default rule is that the
law of armed conflict applies everywhere.
67
See Knut Ipsen, Combatants and Non-Combatants inHANDBOOK OF
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 65, 68, (Dieter Fleck ed., (1995)
(noting that lawful combatants are permitted to use force during an armed conflict
without fear of later prosecution).
68
It is important to note that throughout this discussion of U.S. policy, I am relying
to the extent possible on official statements from the U.S. government or reliable
reporting on the U.S. position. Determining whether the proffered reasons for
action are the actual reasons is beyond the scope of this Article.
66
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counterterrorism operations.69 My focus is on those that affect the selection
of targets. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. policy on targeting
has struggled to reconcile two difficult issues. One is the geography of the
battlefield.70 The basic question is where, exactly, do the laws of armed
conflict apply and where do the more strict human rights-based law
enforcement rules apply.71 The second difficult issue is how to conduct
operations when the opposing forces are not conventional fighting forces. 72
The opposing forces are often individuals who play both a civilian and
military role, are closely integrated into civilian populations, and are often
indistinguishable from them much of the time. These two thorny issues are,
of course, related. In what might be described as the paradigmatic armed
conflict, the battlefield comprises those places in which there are ongoing
kinetic operations, and only within that battlefield, the looser targeting rules
permitted by the laws of armed conflict apply. The law of armed conflict has
evolved a set of considerations to determine when and where there is an
armed conflict at any given moment. Although the details of this issue are
beyond the scope of this Article, two factors typically have been accepted as
part of the definition: that the battlefield has geographic boundaries that are
roughly known by all involved, and that there must be a fairly high level of
ongoing violence for an area to be considered a battlefield. 73
The U.S. argument that it is engaged in a non-international armed
conflict that has no geographic boundaries has come into direct conflict with
these traditional notions of the laws of armed conflict.74 In part to address
69

For just two of many examples, see CARLA HUMUD, ET AL., CONG'L RES. SERV.,
ISLAMIC STATE FINANCING AND U.S. POLICY APPROACHES (2015) (describing
range of policies governing U.S. responses to terrorism financing) and CONG'L
RES. SERV., LEGAL TOOLS TO DETER TRAVEL BY SUSPECTED TERRORISTS: A
BRIEF PRIMER (2015) (describing U.S. policies to stop or reduce travel by potential
terrorists).
70
See Daskal, supra note 22, at 1172-1201 (describing various legal approaches to
determining the location of an armed conflict, including consideration of U.S.
position that the conflict has no boundaries).
71
See Jinks, supra note 25, at 656-57 (describing traditional view that in an armed
conflict, the law of war displaced ordinary law).
72
See BOOTHBY, supra note 46, at 556-60 (analyzing the fit between the
conventional law of armed conflict and new conflicts involving belligerents that
blur the lines between civilian and military operations).
73
See Daskal, supra note 22, 1172-1201 (describing ways to determine the
geographic scope of an armed conflict).
74
See generally Daskal, supra note 22 (describing conflicts between the U.S.
position and the legal arguments made by other states).
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these concerns, the U.S. has promulgated policies that had the effect of
restricting the use of force and ensuring that targeting decisions outside of
active conflict zones were made by senior leaders instead of battlefield
commanders. The most well-known policy is the 2013 Presidential Policy
Guidance, developed by the Obama Administration to regularize the process
by which individuals were selected for targeting. 75 Before the 2013 PPG, U.S.
policy was largely set by its interpretation of the laws of war. Under the U.S.
approach, because there were no geographic limits on the armed conflict with
al Qaeda and associated forces, it was entitled to use lethal force anywhere.
When the Trump Administration came into power in 2017, it changed the
2013 PPG to loosen the standards for targeting. 76 As one of its first acts, the
Biden Administration set aside the looser Trump Administration rules and
implemented more stringent safeguards. 77 In this part, I briefly trace U.S.
policy in these periods. This part is important because it describes the rules
under which the U.S. uses drone strikes in counterterrorism operations. Any
analysis of whether, and under what conditions, drones may be an effective
tool against terrorism must take into consideration the rules under which
drones are used.
i. The 2013 Presidential Policy Guidance
The existence of the 2013 Presidential Policy Guidance (hereinafter
2013 PPG) was suspected before it was disclosed. 78 In a speech in May 2013,
President Obama described in general terms the principles by which his
75

Procedures for Approving Direct Action Against Terrorist Targets Located
Outside the United States and Areas of Active Hostilities, JUSTICE.GOV(May 22,
2013), https://www.justice.gov/oip/foialibrary/procedures_for_approving_direct_action_against_terrorist_targets/downloa
d (introducing term "areas of active hostilities"); Christian Schaller, Using Force
Against Terrorists "Outside Areas of Active Hostilities"—The Obama Approach
and the Bin Laden Raid Revisited, J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 195, 211-218 (2015)
(describing contested issues regarding geography of conflict area under U.S. policy
and practice)., J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 195, 211-218 (2015) (describing contested
issues regarding geography of conflict area under U.S. policy and practice).
76
Charlie Savage & Eric Schmitt, Trump Likely To Ease Limits On Terror War,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2017, at A1.
77
See Savage & Schmitt, supra note 1 (describing Biden Administration decision
to modify Trump Administration policies on the use of drones and kill/capture
raids against terrorism suspects).
78
See Charlie Savage & Peter Baker, Obama, in a Shift, to Limit Targets of Drone
Strikes, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2013 (describing Obama Administration policies
restricting drone strike targeting).
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administration selected individuals for targeting and attempted to reduce
civilian casualties from drone strikes.79 The policy that the President was
describing came to be known as the 2013 PPG.80 The policy explicitly applied
to operations outside of areas of active hostilities (and outside the U.S.).
Those areas were not specified in the policy itself, but news reports indicated
that areas of active hostilities at that time were Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and
parts of Libya.81 Operations outside those areas—such as those undertaken in
Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen—were governed by the policy. The policy
described the bureaucracy and processes of targeting in addition to the
substantive principles that governed U.S. actions.82 The substantive rules
focused on several important issues that have direct parallels in the law of
armed conflict.83 For a lethal operation to be approved, the agency that
wished to undertake that operation, either the C.I.A. or the Department of
Defense, was required to satisfy several important standards. 84 First, the
agency must show that there was a near certainty that a high-value terrorist
or other terrorist target who could be lawfully targeted would be present and

79

President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the National Defense
University (May 23, 2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university.
80
After President Obama's speech at the National Defense University, the White
House released a brief document that outlined U.S. policy. See Press Release,
White House, Fact Sheet: U.S. Policy Standards and Procedures for the Use of
Force in Counterterrorism Operations Outside the United States and Areas of
Active Hostilities (May 23, 2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/thepress-office/2013/05/23/fact-sheet-us-policy-standards-and-procedures-use-forcecounterterrorism. Eventually, in August 2016, in response to a Freedom of
Information Act request from the ACLU, the Department of Justice released a
redacted version of the 2013 PPG. See Charlie Savage, U.S. Releases Drone Strike
"Playbook" for Targeting Terrorism Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2016, at A10.
The declassified document available at https://www.justice.gov/oip/foialibrary/procedures_for_approving_direct_action_against_terrorist_targets/downloa
d.
81
See Charlie Savage, Eric Schmitt & Mark Mazzetti, Obama Expands War with
Al Qaeda to Include Shabab in Somalia, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2016 (describing
Libya's inclusion as an area of active hostilities).
82
See Procedures for Approving Direct Action Against Terrorist Targets Located
Outside the United States and Areas of Active Hostilities, JUSTICE.GOV, (May
22,2013), https://www.justice.gov/oip/foialibrary/procedures_for_approving_direct_action_against_terrorist_targets/downloa
d.
83
Id.
84
Id.
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that the target's activities posed a continuing, imminent threat to the U.S. 85
Second, the agency must show that there was a near certainty that noncombatants would not be killed or injured.86 Third, the agency must make the
case that capture is not feasible.87 The fourth standard is that the country in
which the operation would take place either cannot or will not effectively
address the threat.88 Finally, the agency must show that there were no other
reasonable alternatives to address the threat. 89
These standards largely paralleled the rules imposed by the law of
armed conflict discussed in detail above. They required those using force to
make good-faith efforts to distinguish between lawful combatants and noncombatants, and to avoid operations when the risk of civilian casualties was
too high. They required the U.S. to consider less intrusive or violent means
of accomplishing the same goals. Taken together, these regulations
represented a significant shift in U.S. policy that would, if implemented
strictly and in good faith, limit U.S. operations.
ii. The 2017 Principles, Standards, and Procedures
When the Trump Administration came to power in 2017, U.S. policy
began to change. Most important for my analysis are the changes the Trump
Administration apparently made to the policy framework first laid out in the
2013 PPG.90 In early 2017, the Trump Administration implemented its own
policies, styled as the Principles, Standards, and Procedures (2017 PSP), to
replace the 2013 PPG.91 The overriding aim of the changes to policy was to
simplify the bureaucratic process that drone operators or commanders are
required to follow before launching an operation.92 To accomplish this goal,
85

Id.
See id.
87
See id.
88
See Procedures for Approving Direct Action Against Terrorist Targets Located
Outside the United States and Areas of Active Hostilities, JUSTICE.GOV,
(May22,2013), https://www.justice.gov/oip/foialibrary/procedures_for_approving_direct_action_against_terrorist_targets/downloa
d.
89
See id.
90
These changes were reported in the media but no official policy has been
released. For a description of the changes, see Savage & Schmitt, supra note 76.
91
See Charlie Savage & Eric Schmitt, Trump Poised to Drop Some Limits on
Drone Strikes and Commando Raids, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2017) (describing
Trump Administration changes to targeting rules).
92
See Savage & Schmitt, supra note 76.
86
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the 2017 PSP made two principal changes to earlier policies. 93 First, it
replaced the requirement that targets represent a “continuing, imminent
threat” to U.S. persons with one that would permit more attacks on low-level
targets.94 The effect of this would be to allow commanders and drone
operators to expand the target pool from those with special skills or in
leadership roles to foot soldiers. The second change was to reduce or
eliminate the need for high-level review and approval for strikes. 95 Decisionmaking authority would be devolved to lower-level officials.
In addition to changing the substantive targeting rules, the Trump
Administration also decided to designate more places as “areas of active
hostilities,” thus exempting those areas altogether from the restraints imposed

93

There has been a robust debate about these issues among scholars and
policymakers. See, e.g., Robert Chesney, President Trump Ponders Changes to the
Lethal Force Policy Constraints: What You Need to Know, LAWFARE (Sept. 22,
2017), https://www.lawfareblog.com/president-trump-ponders-changes-lethalforce-policy-constraints-what-you-need-know (describing differences between
Trump and Obama Administration targeting policies); Adriana Edmeades Jones,
Implications of Trump’s New Drone Policy for Countries Assisting the U.S., JUST
SECURITY (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/47011/implicationstrumps-drone-policy-countries-assisting-u-s/ (describing ways that U.S. policy
affects partner countries in counterterrorism operations); Ryan Goodman, Why
the Laws of War Apply to Drone Strikes Outside “Areas of Active Hostilities:” (A
Memo to the Human Rights Community), Just Security (Oct. 4, 2017),
https://www.justsecurity.org/45613/laws-war-apply-drone-strikes-areas-activehostilities-a-memo-human-rights-community/ (arguing that the law of armed
conflict rules affects who may be targeted outside areas of active hostilities);
Marko Milanovic, On Whether IHL Applies to Drone Strikes Outside “Areas of
Active Hostilities:” A Response to Ryan Goodman, EJIL: TALK! (Oct. 5, 2017),
https://www.ejiltalk.org/on-whether-ihl-applies-to-drone-strikes-outside-areas-ofactive-hostilities-a-response-to-ryan-goodman/ (arguing that the geographic
contours of the armed conflict affect targeting rules).
94
Savage & Schmitt, supra note 76.
95
Savage & Schmitt, supra note 76.
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by policy.96 In practice, this means that commanders could launch strikes
against individuals they believed to be members of belligerent forces—such
as al-Qaeda or al-Shabab—without determining that those individuals posed
a threat to Americans or that capturing them was infeasible.
iii. Biden Administration Policy
The Biden Administration has signaled its intentions to undertake a
thorough review of the use of drones in counterterrorism operations. 97 In the
meantime, the Obama Administration approach may give some clues as to
the eventual policy. The Obama Administration was reluctant to commit
large numbers of American troops in conflict areas, preferring to rely on
drones and using smaller contingents of U.S. troops in collaboration with
local partner forces.98 This policy was based on two factors that will also
affect the Biden Administration. The first is that there is pressure from the
American public and some actors in host countries to reduce U.S. troop
numbers. This is particularly true in Afghanistan after the Trump
Administration signed an agreement with the Taliban to withdraw American
troops. In August 2021, the Biden Administration ordered the withdrawal of
all troops from Afghanistan on an accelerated timetable. On August 31, 2021,
96

In 2016, the U.S. considered Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria to be areas of active
hostilities and thus exempt from the heightened targeting standards. That list
expanded to include at least Somalia and Yemen. See OFF. OF THE DIRECTOR OF
NAT’L INTEL., SUMMARY OF 2016 INFO. REGARDING U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM
STRIKES OUTSIDE AREAS OF ACTIVE HOSTILITIES (Jan. 19, 2017),
https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/reports-publications/reportspublications-2017/item/1741-summary-of-information-regarding-u-scounterterrorism-strikes-outside-areas-of-active-hostilities (stating that
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria were considered to be areas of active hostilities during
2016); That list expanded to include at least Somalia and Yemen. See Charlie
Savage & Eric Schmitt, Trump Eases Rules in Somalia Protecting Civilians in
Strikes, N.Y. TIMES Mar. 30, 2017, at A1 (describing policy changes regarding
targeting rules in Somalia); Charlie Savage & Eric Schmitt, Trump Administration
Is Said to Be Working to Loosen Counterterrorism Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12,
2017) (describing changes in targeting rules in Yemen).
97
See Savage & Schmitt, supra note 1 (reporting changes to U.S. policy and the
Biden Administration intention to undertake policy review).
98
See Barack Obama, 44th U.S. President, Remarks by the President at the
National Defense University (May 23, 2013), in THE WHITE HOUSE OFF. OF THE
PRESS SECRETARY, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university (describing use of
drones as a way to mitigate risks to U.S. troops while still achieving strategic
objectives).
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President Biden announced the end of the war in Afghanistan. 99 100 The
second factor is that U.S. policymakers have increasingly come to view
drones as a lower-cost approach to exerting U.S. influence. Policymakers and
advocates have argued that drones are able to accomplish U.S. goals without
risking American lives.101 This increased faith in drones and attendant
pressure to reduce the use of troops is likely to push the Biden Administration
toward a policy that is similar to that of its predecessors. Thus even without
specific details of Biden Administration policy, it is reasonable to conclude
that drones will remain a substantial, and controversial, part of U.S.
counterterrorism strategy.
International and domestic law and U.S. policies place legal limits on
how the U.S. may conduct counterterrorism operations. As Part II has shown,
it is not enough for the U.S. to assert that its practices are effective. Instead,
belligerents, including the U.S. as it pursues terrorists, must comply with the
law even if that means foregoing otherwise effective means and methods of
attacking suspected terrorists.
II.

STUDIES OF THE EFFECTS OF DIRECT ACTIONS

The U.S. drone program has been a significant part of U.S.
counterterrorism operations since 2002 and has become one of the most
prominent aspects of U.S. policy.102 Since the U.S. began to use drones to
target militants and launch missiles, the program has come under intense
scrutiny and criticism. This criticism took several forms, but it centered on
99

See Joe Biden, 46th U.S. President, Remarks by President Biden on the End of
the War in Afghanistan (Aug. 31, 2021), in THE WHITE HOUSE BRIEFING ROOM,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speechesremarks/2021/08/31/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-end-of-the-war-inafghanistan/.
100
Missy Ryan & Karen DeYoung, Biden Will Withdraw All U.S. Forces from
Afghanistan by Sept. 11, 2021, WASH. POST (April 13, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/biden-us-troop-withdrawalafghanistan/2021/04/13/918c3cae-9beb-11eb-8a83-3bc1fa69c2e8_story.html.
101
See, e.g., Daniel Byman, Why Drones Work: The Case for Washington's
Weapon of Choice, 92 FOREIGN AFF. 32, 33-34 (2013) (arguing that drone strikes
are an effective and relatively low-cost means by which to advance U.S.
counterterrorism policy goals).
102
See, e.g., Christopher J. Fuller, The Eagle Has Come Home to Roost: The
Historical Origins of the CIA's Lethal Drone Program, 30 INTEL. & NAT'L SEC.
769, 785-788 (2015) (describing history and controversy of U.S. drone use in
foreign policy).
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three dominant themes: (1) that the program violated international law, (2)
that it was immoral because it often killed or wounded civilians, and (3) that
it was not the most effective way to achieve the U.S.'s stated policy
objectives.103 Thus the question of whether missile strikes—particularly
those launched from unmanned aerial vehicles—are an effective
counterterrorism tool has been of vital concern to scholars, advocates, and
policymakers since the U.S. and its allies began to use them in the years after
the attacks of September 11, 2001. Determining how best to assess the
effectiveness of drone strikes has been a persistent and vexing problem.
There is no clear consensus about what it means for the drone program
to be “effective.”104 When considering the problem in the abstract,
counterterrorism analysts and policymakers in the U.S. often argue that the
counterterrorism tools are effective if they prevent terrorist attacks in the
United States or Europe.105 This is, of course, a crude measure, important as
it is to policymakers. There is no way to determine, for example, which of
the many aspects of counterterrorism policy might be responsible for the
absence of a large-scale, 9/11-style attack in the U.S. Scholars have instead
looked to more precise approaches to determine if particular components of
counterterrorism policy are effective at preventing violence in some way.
There is a small but growing number of studies that address these questions,

103

See, e.g., Sadat, supra note 3, at 224-226 (analyzing legal issues with U.S.
drone policies and practices); Matt Peterson, Is Obama's Drone War Moral? The
Ethics of Defensive Killing, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 18, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/08/obama-dronemorality/496433/ (describing debates regarding the morality of U.S. drone strikes
in counterterrorism operations); Audrey Kurth Cronin, Why Drones Fail: When
Tactics Drive Strategy, 92 FOREIGN AFF. 44, 50-51 (2013) (arguing that evidence
of the effectiveness of drone strikes is inconclusive at best).
104
See generally Obama, supra note 98 (arguing that drones are effective, in part,
because they keep U.S. troops out of harm's way); Max Abrahms & Jochen
Mierau, Leadership Matters: The Effects of Targeted Killings on Militant Group
Tactics, 29 TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE 830 (2017) (investigating whether drone
strikes that kill militant leaders cause an increase in militant violence); Patrick B.
Johnston, Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership
Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns, 36 INT'L SEC. 47 (2012)
(investigating whether conflicts end sooner when militant leaders are killed).
105
See, e.g., White House, Remarks by the President at the National Defense
University (May 23, 2013) (noting that drone strikes have prevented attacks
against the U.S. homeland), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university.
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and it is to these studies that I turn in this part.
The basic research strategy for the empirical studies is similar.
Researchers analyze the relationship among the frequency, lethality, and
intended targets of militant attacks in some areas before and after missile
attacks.106 In recent years, mostly working with data from the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas in Pakistan, researchers have analyzed the
relationships between missile strikes and militant attacks. 107 They have asked
a series of important questions about whether and how missile strikes affect
militant violence. The emerging evidence about the relationship between
missile strikes and militant violence addresses questions in three broad
categories. First, some of the studies attempt to determine if missile strikes
are associated with an increase or decrease in the number of militant attacks.
Were there more or fewer militant attacks in the area in the days or weeks
after a strike than at other times? Second, some of the studies attempt to
determine the extent of the effect of missile strikes on militant violence.
These studies have asked a series of related questions. If the number of
militant attacks is affected by missile strikes, how long does the effect last?
Do missile strikes affect the number of militant attacks only in those areas
geographically proximate to the strike, or is their effect more broadly
distributed? Do strikes displace militants to other areas, thereby increasing
violence in those areas? Third, some of the studies ask what kind of effect
missile strikes have on militant violence. These studies ask questions like
whether it matters whom the missile strikes target, leaders, or lower-level
militants, for example? Do missile strikes affect some kinds of militant
attacks more than others? For example, do missile strikes decrease the
number of militant attacks on civilians or civilian infrastructure but increase
attacks on military personnel or infrastructure?
In this part, I analyze the emerging evidence regarding the
effectiveness of missile strikes on militant targets. These studies reveal four
main findings, which I discuss in more detail below. Two of those findings
should give comfort to proponents of drone strikes, at least with respect to
whether strikes decrease militant violence. But, importantly, two findings
106

See, e.g., Patrick B. Johnston & Anoop K. Sarbahi, The Impact of U.S. Drone
Strikes on Terrorism in Pakistan, 60 INT'L STUD. QUARTERLY 203, 208 (2016)
(describing statistical strategy for empirical study); Johnston, supra note 104, at
59-76 (describing research strategy); Mir & Moore, supra note 13, at 849
(describing empirical strategy).
107
See, e.g., Mir & Moore, supra note 13, at 849-850 (describing geographic area
from which data were analyzed).
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suggest that the U.S.’s use of drone strikes may violate international
humanitarian law, which every U.S. administration has pledged to follow.
First, the studies show that missile strikes are associated with reductions in
militant violence, at least in areas near where the missile struck.108 Second,
the reduction in militant violence in the area around the site of the missile
strike is apparently not the result of displacement of violence to other nearby
areas. Taken together, these findings suggest that drone strikes are
accomplishing at least some of the strategic objectives of the U.S.
But there is strong evidence of significant harm to civilians, which
renders the programs illegal. The third finding from the new studies is that
militant violence after “successful” drone strikes—that is, those that kill an
intended militant leader—appear to have the effect of shifting militant
violence from military to civilian targets. Civilians may suffer more militant
violence after a strike than they did before. The fourth and final finding is
both the most tentative at this point and perhaps the most important. The
reduction in militant violence after a missile strike is not mostly due to the
effects of the strike—that is whether it killed a militant leader or merely
disrupted militant planning. Instead the reduction appears to be due in large
part to the effects of persistent surveillance and monitoring by drones and
quick targeting decisions by the U.S. and its partners may be contributing to
the reduction in militant attacks. What is important about this finding is that
the surveillance and monitoring is general; it is not limited to militants.
Civilians as well as militants are observed by surveillance drones. Civilians
as well as militants are subject to electronic monitoring. And there is evidence
that the disruptions to the lives of militants—credited with reducing militant
violence—are also severely harming civilian populations. Taken together,
these findings show at least some of the effects that drone strikes have on
civilian populations. If a predictable effect of military action is to make the
lives of civilians worse, that action warrants significant scrutiny under the
applicable laws of armed conflict.
Before analyzing the findings, it is important to note the limitations
of these studies. It is not possible to determine as a matter of scientific
certainty whether and how drone strikes affect militant violence, and the
authors of the studies do not make this claim. The studies are all interested in
determining the relationship between drone strikes and militant violence.
They follow the same basic methodology by first attempting to identify a
correlation between drone strikes and changes in militant violence. In the
main, they do this by using geolocation data about drone strikes—where and
108

See discussion infra Section II.A.
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when a strike occurred—and examining the type, targets, and lethality of
militant violence before and after the strike. By doing this they are able to
find a consistent association between strikes and militant violence. They then
investigate whether the actual violence after a strike was more or less than
the level of violence that would have been expected in the absence of a strike.
This is not, of course, sufficient to support a claim that drone strikes
definitively cause an increase or decrease in militant violence. But it is among
the best available evidence, and certainly more robust than the evidence put
forth by staunchest proponents of drone strikes, who argue that drones are
effective because the U.S. homeland has not been attacked. A second
limitation is that these studies are not able to examine every area in which the
U.S. has used drones since the 9/11 attacks. There are no similar studies on
the effect of drone strikes in Yemen or Somalia, for example, places where
the U.S. has used drones extensively. Thus, the studies that I analyze may not
be generalizable (and the authors do not claim that they are). Again, even
with this limitation these studies are among the best available evidence.
A. Drone Strikes Appear to Reduce Militant Attacks
Despite a lack of clarity surrounding what policymakers mean when
they argue that drone strikes are an effective tool against potential terrorists,
researchers analyzing strikes typically look at whether militant violence
increases or decreases in the region around the strike in the weeks or months
after a strike.109 The most basic finding from the recent studies of the effects
of U.S. drone strikes is that strikes are associated with an overall decrease in
militant violence, at least in the geographic area near the strike. Consider for
example one of the most detailed of the recent studies.110 There researchers
looked at the effects of drone strikes in the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas in Pakistan on militant violence in those areas of Pakistan and nearby
areas of Afghanistan during the period January 2007 through September
2011.111 In general, the study found that “drone strikes are associated with
substantial short-term reductions in terrorist violence.” 112 The researchers
found that drone strikes are associated with a reduction in militant attacks
109

See generally Johnston, supra note 104 (investigating whether conflicts end
sooner when militant leaders are killed); Mir & Moore, supra note 13, at 860.
110
See generally Johnston & Sarbahi, supra note 106 (analyzing the impact of
drone strikes on the incidence of terrorism in Pakistan and finding that drone
strikes are associated with a decrease in militant violence, among other findings).
111
See Johnston & Sarbahi, supra note 106, at 208 (describing statistical strategy
for empirical study).
112
Johnston & Sarbahi, supra note 106, at 204.

28

20:1

2021

Santa Clara Journal of International Law

near the strike, and a reduction in the lethality of the strikes that did occur. 113
They also found some evidence, albeit not as strong as that supporting the
other findings, that the reduction in militant violence could last for as long as
five weeks.114 Other researchers have made similar findings, albeit with some
slight differences.115 For example, one study found that drone strikes appear
to decrease overall militant violence in Pakistan, with an increase in the first
week after the attack and a subsequent diminution in violence in subsequent
weeks.116 The same study found that drone strikes in Afghanistan appeared
to have little effect on militant violence there. 117 A more recent study that
examined the effects of drone strikes in the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas in Pakistan found that during the years when it operated most actively,
the U.S. drone program “corresponds with a reduction in violence on the
order of nine to thirteen insurgent attacks per month and fifty-one to eightysix casualties per month."118
B. Drone Strikes Do Not Appear to Displace Violence to Other
Geographic Areas
One concern with drone strikes is that they might simply displace
militant violence from near the area targeted with the drone to another area. 119
This is particularly important in counterterrorism operations because terrorist

113

See Johnston & Sarbahi, supra note 106, at 212 (finding that “drone strikes are
associated with a reduction in militant violence in the areas where they occur” and
are “negatively associated with the lethality … of militant attacks in these same
areas”).
114
See Johnston & Sarbahi, supra note 106, at 215 (finding that reductions in
militant violence may last for up to five weeks, but the data make “it difficult to
make definitive claims about the duration of drones' violence-reducing effects”).
115
See generally David A. Jaeger & Zahra Siddique, Are Drone Strikes Effective in
Afghanistan and Pakistan? On the Dynamics of Violence Between the United
States and the Taliban, 4 CESIFO ECONOMIC STUDIES 667 (2018) (finding, based
on empirical examination, that drone strikes appear to reduce militant violence).
116
See id. at 695-96 (finding a "vengeance effect in the first week” and a
"deterrent/incapacitation effect” thereafter).
117
See id. at 695 (finding "there is little impact significant of drone strikes on
Taliban attacks in Afghanistan").
118
Mir & Moore, supra note 13, at 846.
119
See generally Austin Long, Whack-a-Mole or Coup de Grace?
Institutionalization and Leadership Targeting in Iraq and Afghanistan, 23
SECURITY STUD. 471 (2014) (analyzing whether targeting militant leaders with
drone strikes has the effect of displacing militant violence).
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groups do not respect national borders. 120 Indeed in 2009 the U.S. appointed
a special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan,121 recognizing that
"Afghanistan and Pakistan now constituted a single theatre of war." 122 U.S.
counterterrorism strategy recognizes that the Taliban and associated forces
move from Afghanistan to areas in Pakistan, essentially rendering the border
meaningless.123 Thus, the possibility that a terrorist entity with strong roots
in multiple places might move when faced with drone strikes in one place
was significant.
The risk of displacement poses an obvious strategic problem—merely
moving terrorist attacks around is not a productive long-term strategy—and
a problem for researchers. If researchers are investigating the effectiveness
of drone strikes and notice a reduction in violence in the area of the strike and
do not account for the possibility of displacement, they may incorrectly
conclude that drone strikes reduce violence when in reality they merely shift
it from one place to another. 124 But researchers have found that this does not

120

See, e.g., David Ignatius, How ISIS Spread in the Middle East, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, (Oct. 29, 2015)
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/how-isis-started-syriairaq/412042/ (documenting the movement of ISIS across borders throughout the
Middle East).
121
Glenn Kessler, Mitchell and Holbrooke to be Named Envoys, WASH. POST (Jan.
21, 2009) http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2009/01/mitchell-and-holbrooketo-be-n.html.
122
George Packer, The Last Mission: Richard Holbrooke's Plan to Avoid the
Mistakes of Vietnam in Afghanistan, THE NEW YORKER (Sept. 21, 2009)
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/09/28/the-last-mission (reporting the
views of Richard Holbrooke, named the first U.S. Special Representative for
Afghanistan and Pakistan).
123
See, e.g., Ishtiaq Ahmad, The U.S. Af-Pak Strategy: Challenges and
Opportunities for Pakistan, 37 ASIAN AFFAIRS: AN AMERICAN REVIEW 191, 194
(2010) (describing, based on U.S. strategy, that the U.S. Af-Pak strategy … treats
Afghanistan and Pakistan as two countries but one challenge).
124
Although the recent empirical evidence finds that there is not a displacement of
violence from one geographic area to another, there is some contrary evidence.
One report from an advocacy group, based on media report and data on drone
strikes finds that militants are displaced by drone strikes and that after they move
they engage in violence—both terrorism and conventional crime—in the areas to
which they flee to avoid drone strikes. See Wali Aslam, Remote Control Project,
TERRORIST RELOCATION AND THE SOCIETAL CONSEQUENCES OF U.S. DRONE
STRIKES IN PAKISTAN 2-3 (2014).
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appear to be the case.125 Drone strikes "reduce militant violence in the local
areas in which they are conducted" and "in proximate areas." 126 They
concluded that there is "no conclusive evidence that drone strikes cause
violence to spill over into neighboring areas." 127 Thus the reductions in
militant violence appear to be caused by reasons other than displacement.
C. Decapitation Strikes Appear to Shift Militant Violence from
Military to Civilian Targets
Despite the evidence that drone strikes appear to correspond with a
reduction in militant violence, there is countervailing evidence that supports
the argument that U.S. tactics may be inconsistent with international
humanitarian law. A prominent part of the U.S. drone-based strategy is to
target the leadership of terrorist organizations with drone strikes. 128 Perhaps
the most famous example of this is the U.S. attack that killed Osama bin
Laden.129 Many of the strikes discussed above were strikes designed to kill a
terrorist leader, almost all local or regional leaders much less prominent than
bin Laden. Researchers have recently turned to the question of whether the
targeting of terrorist leaders can be an effective part of counterterrorism
efforts.130 These studies, using similar but not identical research strategies,
have revealed evidence that should be central to any assessment of whether
U.S. strategy is consistent with the laws of armed conflict. 131 Drone strikes
125

See Johnston & Sarbahi, supra note 106, at 214-215 (finding that drone strikes
do not displace violence to nearby geographic areas).
126
Johnston & Sarbahi, supra note 106, at 215.
127
Johnston & Sarbahi, supra note 106, at 215.
128
See, e.g., NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COUNTERTERRORISM OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 13, (Oct. 2018)
https://www.dni.gov/files/NCTC/documents/news_documents/NSCT.pdf (noting
that U.S. strategy is to target "terrorist leaders, operational planners" and others
with special expertise) ; Daniel Byman, Do Targeted Killings Work?, 85 FOREIGN
AFF. 95, 96 (2006) (noting that the U.S. has adopted a policy of attempting to kill
terrorist leaders); Max Fisher, Does Killing Terrorists Leaders Make Any
Difference? Scholars Are Doubtful , N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2016, at A3 (describing
strategy employed by the U.S. and other states to target terrorist leaders as a way to
weaken the organization).
129
See Obama, supra note 98, (describing successful mission to kill Bin Laden).
130
See, e.g., Johnston, supra note 104, at 47-48 (describing recent increase in
empirical scholarship on targeting terrorist leaders). Johnston also catalogues the
few earlier articles that argued that leadership targeting is, or would likely be,
ineffective. Id.
131
See generally Anouk S. Rigterink, The Wane of Command: Evidence on Drone
Strikes and Control within Terrorist Organizations, 115 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 31
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that kill terrorist leaders are associated with a shift in militant strategy from
using violence that targets military or other government targets to targeting
civilians for attacks. The researchers who have looked at this question
specifically largely agree on the finding, but they offer a range of theories to
explain it. Some suggest that those militants who take over after a leader is
killed are less able to control their underlings, leading to more indiscriminate
attacks against civilians.132 Others suggest that when leaders are killed,
lower-level militants take over and they have weaker incentives to respect the
civilian population and are less likely to view local civilians as a potential
support base.133 Regardless of the exact mechanism, there is robust evidence
indicating that there has been a significant rise in militant violence against
civilians as a result of U.S.-led decapitation strikes.134

(2021) (finding that drone strikes that kill a terrorist leader are associated with an
increase in militant violence relative to strikes that fail to kill a leader); Abrahms &
Potter, supra note 12 (finding that militant groups whose leadership is disrupted by
strikes are more likely to target civilians when compared to those whose leadership
is more stable); Abrahms & Mierau, supra note 104 (finding that after a strike
killing a leader, militant groups become less discriminate in their violence and
therefore more likely to target civilians). One study examined leadership strikes
albeit with a different focus and concluded that killing leaders appears to be
associated with a shorter life expectancy for terrorist groups. Bryan C. Price,
Targeting Top Terrorists: How Leadership Decapitation Contributes to
Counterterrorism, 36 INT'L SECURITY 9, 43-44 (2012). Price did not examine the
effects of leadership strikes on militant violence against civilian populations.
132
. See How Leadership Decapitation Contributes to Counterterrorism, 36 INT'L
SECURITY 9, 48 (2012) (suggesting that killing terrorist leaders can undermine
terrorist leadership and result in new leaders who are less able to control other
militants).
133
See Abrahms & Potter, supra note 12, at 329 (finding that "successful
decapitation strikes are associated with both an increase in civilian targeting and a
decrease in military targeting, though in different time frames"). Abrahms and
Potter explain their findings in part by suggesting that lower-level militants have
lower incentives to respect civilians. Abrahms & Potter, supra note 12, at 313. The
authors of a separate study found that decapitation strikes were associated with
shift toward relatively more militant violence against civilians and away from
military targets. Abrahms & Mierau, supra note 104, at 831-32. The most plausible
explanation, they argued, was that decapitation strikes create "leadership deficits
that empower lower-level members of the organization with inferior civilian
restraint." Abrahms & Mierau, supra note 104, at 832.
134
See Abrahms & Mierau, supra note 104, at 842 (finding increase in militant
violence against civilians relative to violence against military targets after a
decapitation strike).
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This finding also helps to make sense of a study which found that
targeting leaders can reduce militant violence.135 Importantly, that study did
not consider whether militants shift their focus from military to civilian
targets after a strike that kills a militant leader. 136 Studies that look
specifically at the problem of militants shifting their focus from military to
civilian targets help to explain this seeming outlier result. 137 Because the
drone campaign is associated with a decrease in militant violence against
military targets, including members of the U.S. military and its allies, some
researchers and policymakers might conclude that such strikes were effective.
The best analysis of this issue comes from research by Max Abrahms and
Philip B.K. Potter.138 Abrahms and Potter find that because drone strikes limit
"attacks on coalition and government forces, at least in the short term,"
leaders and researchers such as Johnston might conclude that "decapitation
strikes may be strategically effective." 139 They note that the "corresponding
increase in civilian targeting is clearly undesirable from a normative
perspective,"140 but they do not analyze the implications of this finding under
international humanitarian law.
D. Persistent Surveillance and Monitoring Necessary for
Drone Programs Appear to Cause Significant Social Disruption
Drone strikes are only possible with significant infrastructure to
support them. Typically drone strikes happen only after substantial
surveillance and monitoring to identify targets and attempt to ensure that
civilian casualties are minimized.141 One of the most important findings from
a new empirical study is that this monitoring and surveillance infrastructure
appears to be responsible for most of the decrease in militant violence. Thus
it appears that it is not the strikes themselves—even those that kill militants—
135

See Johnston, supra note 106, at 77 (finding that "neutralizing insurgent leaders
has a substantively large and statistically significant effect on numerous metrics of
counter militancy effectiveness").
136
See Johnston, supra note 106 at 59-76 (describing research strategy).
137
See generally Rigterink, supra note 131 at 31, (finding that drone strikes that
kill a terrorist leader are associated with an increase in militant violence relative to
strikes that fail to kill a leader); Abrahms & Potter, supra note 12, at 311 (finding
that militant groups whose leadership is disrupted by strikes are more likely to
target civilians when compared to those whose leadership is more stable).
138
See Abrahms & Potter, supra note 12, at 331.
139
Abrahms & Potter, supra note 12, at 331.
140
Abrahms & Potter, supra note 12, at 331.
141
See, e.g., Mir & Moore, supra note 13, at 848-49 (describing surveillance and
intelligence infrastructure of U.S. drone program).
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that are responsible for decreasing militant violence. Instead, what decreases
militant violence appears to be all of the behavioral changes produced by the
monitoring and surveillance infrastructure. These findings have implications
for whether the U.S. and its partners have been complying with the laws of
armed conflict in areas in which drone strikes are an important part of
counterterrorism operations.
These findings come from a study by Asfandyar Mir and Dylan
Moore that complements studies done by several other researchers. 142 Mir
and Moore examined in detail the rates of violence in specific parts of the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas during the mid-2000s. This period is
significant in part because there was substantial militant violence at that
time.143 It is also important because the U.S. had obtained, through agreement
with the government of Pakistan, the legal right to control the airspace above
Pakistan. U.S. planners and operators were able to engage in persistent,
pervasive surveillance of the population in those parts of Waziristan for
several years, all with the acquiescence of the government of Pakistan. This
is important because it suggests that other areas in which the U.S. is able to
operate with significant control of the airspace—including, at different times,
Afghanistan, Somalia, and Yemen—would be subject to similar dynamics.
In their study, Mir and Moore were able to exploit an agreement
between the U.S. and the government of Pakistan that produced a kind of
natural experiment. In North Waziristan, part of the FATA, the U.S.
government obtained permission to operate counterterrorism operations
freely.144 In other parts of the FATA, the U.S. did not operate in a similar
way. Importantly, the two areas were very similar to each other in terms of
demographics and militant activity, enough to permit the areas outside of
Waziristan to serve as a kind of control group for researchers looking back at
militant violence and its possible causes. Mir and Moore found that, overall,
the drone program substantially reduced militant attacks in the areas under

142

See, e.g., Mir & Moore, supra note 13, at 860 (summarizing findings and
describing relationship between their study and previous work).
143
See, e.g., Mir & Moore, supra note 13, at 849-857 (describing militant violence
in area under study).
144
See Mir & Moore, supra note 13, at 849 (describing empirical strategy of
comparing militant attack data in North Waziristan, where the U.S. controlled the
airspace and engaged in drone strikes, to other parts of the Federally Administered
Tribal Areas, where the U.S. did not operate in a similar way).
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study.145
In addition to finding that militant violence went down in response to
drone strikes—a finding that other researchers have also made 146—Mir and
Moore examined the reasons why militant violence likely decreased. 147 They
attempted to disaggregate the effects of drone strikes on militant activity,
which they called kinetic effects, from other reasons for observed decreases
in militant violence, which they called anticipatory effects. 148 They reasoned
that the total effect of the drone program "need not be composed of simply
the aggregation of short-run responses to individual strikes." 149 The
anticipatory effects were caused by several factors, two of which are
particularly important.150 First, the program included widespread, pervasive
surveillance of the population.151 Second, the U.S. government agreement
with Pakistan allowed the U.S. to make decisions about strikes very quickly
in response to surveillance and intelligence.152 Based on both quantitative and
qualitative research,153 they found that these two components of the drone
program were particularly powerful. When they examined more closely the
likely causes of the reduction in militant violence, they found that almost
three-fourths of the total drop in militant violence was caused by the

145

See Mir & Moore, supra note 13, at 846 (finding that the "drone program
corresponds with a reduction in violence on the order of nine to thirteen insurgent
attacks per month and fifty-one to eighty-six casualties per month").
146
See Mir & Moore, supra note 13, at 858 (describing the research strategies they
adopted to go further than previous researchers to examine root causes for
decreases in militant violence).
147
See Mir & Moore, supra note 13, at 858 (describing efforts to "probe the
mechanisms mediating the negative association between the U.S. drone program
and insurgent violence documented" in their study).
148
See Mir & Moore, supra note 13, at 858 (describing efforts to distinguish effect
of strikes from other reasons for reductions in violence).
149
See Mir & Moore, supra note 13, at 858.
150
See Mir & Moore, supra note 13, at 859 (describing anticipatory effects
associated with drone program).
151
See Mir & Moore, supra note 13, at 859 (describing U.S. government's ability
to undertake widespread surveillance and intelligence gathering in the target areas
during the relevant time period).
152
See Mir & Moore, supra note 13, at 859 (describing U.S. agreement with
Pakistan during the relevant time period).
153
See Mir & Moore, supra note 13, at 859 (describing qualitative evidence used to
supplement quantitative research).
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anticipatory effects.154
The reasons for this are particularly important to my argument. Mir
and Moore found, based on both quantitative and qualitative evidence, that
surveillance, rapid exploitation of intelligence, and occasional strikes worked
together to "substantially increase insurgents' perceptions of the risks
associated with activities they believe might precipitate strikes." 155 They
found that the program, as a whole, was associated with "restricted
movement, constrained communication, and compromised intragroup
trust."156
These findings are noteworthy because there is no reason to suspect
that these effects are limited to militants. One of the hallmarks of the current
era of counterterrorism operations is that militants are typically fully
integrated into the civilian population.157 Counterterrorism operations that
affect militants inevitably affect local civilians as well. From the perspective
of the local population, pervasive surveillance affects them as much as it
affects militants. Similarly, if militants are re-calculating their perception of
what might produce a drone strike, then civilians were likely to be doing the
same calculation. Perhaps most troubling is the finding that intragroup trust
is decreased by the program as a whole. When civilian populations are
struggling to live with the effects of counterterrorism operations, bonds of
family trust and support are likely to be more important than at any other
time. Indeed, Mir and Moore themselves acknowledge the morally complex
nature of their findings. They note that their "work suggests—perhaps
troublingly—that the U.S. drone program in Pakistan undermined the
insurgency despite harming civilians."158 Their observation that "strategic
gains are possible even when civilians are harmed" 159 should be important to
policymakers for moral reasons, but it is highly relevant to the legal
evaluation of the program.

154

See Mir & Moore, supra note 13, at 859 ("[A]nalysis suggests that nearly 75
percent of the violence reduction is associated with the drone program period
without airstrikes and about 25 percent is associated with aggregated effects of
individual strikes").
155
See Mir & Moore, supra note 13, at 859.
156
See Mir & Moore, supra note 13, at 847
157
See Ganesh Sitaraman, Counterinsurgency, the War on Terror, and the Laws of
War, 95 VA. L. REV. 1745, 1758 (2009) (describing mixing of civilian and militant
populations).
158
Mir & Moore, supra note 13, at 860.
159
Mir & Moore, supra note 13, at 860.

36

20:1

2021

Santa Clara Journal of International Law

III.

EVIDENCE OF TERRORIZING EFFECTS ON CIVILIANS

Drone strikes affect civilians and militants alike.160 Mir and Moore's
findings regarding the effects of the drone program on civilians are far from
the only findings on this issue. There have been many other studies of the
ways that counterterrorism operations affect civilians. While it is beyond the
scope of this Article to fully analyze these reports, it is important to
summarize some of their key findings. For the purposes of my argument,
what matters most is that these reports are entirely consistent with Mir and
Moore's findings: the U.S. drone program substantially disrupts the lives of
affected populations, and this disruption is not limited to those civilians and
militants who are killed or wounded by drone strikes.
The study by Mir and Moore argues that the effects of the drone
program—including persistent surveillance, quick decision-making and
targeting, and missile strikes—degrade militant organizations by affecting
them in three principal areas: "movement, communication, and trust." 161 Mir
and Moore focused their research on how these issues affected militant
groups, but there is nothing in their research to suggest that only militants are
affected. Indeed, there is substantial evidence, discussed below, to support
the notion that civilians are indeed deeply affected in the same ways.
Before moving on, it is important to note that there is also nothing in
the logic of Mir and Moore's interpretation of their own evidence that would
suggest that civilians are somehow exempt from the effects of the drone
program. The U.S. drone program, as described in Mir and Moore's study,
relies on pervasive surveillance of the entire population.162 Surveillance is not
limited to militants; the entire population is under surveillance. Thus civilians
living under that surveillance regime know that their communications are
monitored. Even if civilians are not planning militant attacks, persistent
surveillance of personal communications is likely to chill speech and limit
how all members of the community interact. Further, the reason for militants
160

See, e.g., Fotini Christia, et al., The Effect of Drone Strikes on Civilian
Communication: Evidence from Yemen, POLITICAL SCIENCE RESEARCH AND
METHODS, 2020, at 1, 2 (finding, based on analysis of cell phone data
communications patterns that drone strikes in Yemen “appear to have a wider
ripple effect on the civilian population”),
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/political-science-research-andmethods/article/effect-of-drone-strikes-on-civilian-communication-evidence-fromyemen/38480475B14669666FEC6C72BE93BD8A.
161
Mir & Moore, supra note 13, at 859.
162
See discussion infra Section III.C.
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to curtail their movements appears to be two-fold, as discussed in detail
above.163 Because of its extensive surveillance capabilities, the U.S.
surveillance and drone program was able to process information quickly and
turn intelligence into action more quickly than would otherwise have been
possible. Thus militants, and civilians, never knew when or where the next
drone strike would happen. It is therefore not surprising that militants would
curtail their movements under these conditions. And there is no reason to
conclude that civilians would not be similarly affected. Finally, the
breakdown in trust and social bonds that affected militant groups likely also
affected the civilian population. From the civilian perspective, drone strikes
would appear random; civilians would have no idea when or where the next
strike might occur. Lack of trust hampered the ability of militants to plan and
execute attacks. With civilians, the effects would be felt in their ordinary
lives: less socializing, weaker community ties, and an impaired ability to
participate in necessary social rituals like funerals and weddings.
In this part, I survey the evidence demonstrating that all of the issues
that Mir and Moore describe as possibilities in their research are borne out by
other studies. There is evidence of the ways that civilians are forced to curtail
their movements because of counterterrorism operations. Similarly, civilian
communication is affected, making it more difficult for people to coordinate
ordinary activities. Perhaps the most significant consequences are those that
affect community trust. This appears to occur in several ways. Because of
persistent surveillance and seemingly random strikes, civilians are unable to
engage in the kinds of trust-building and trust-sustaining activities necessary
for healthy communities. In addition, because strikes are undertaken quickly
in response to intelligence that civilians do not have access to, it is difficult
for civilians to know who is safe to be around and where it is safe to work or
engage in community activities. Finally, communities are affected because
the trauma associated with strikes and surveillance is cumulative. Individuals
are affected by what happens to neighbors and close family members. And
because of the opacity of counterterrorism decision-making and the
suddenness of strikes, members of the community do not know when or if
they can relax their vigilance.
A. Curtailment of Movement
The U.S. drone program has a substantial, harmful effect on civilian
movement at very basic levels. In a study that relied on structured interviews
of Afghans who were living in or had lived in areas subjected to "drone
163

See discussion supra Section II.D.
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surveillance and bombardment," researchers found that civilians suffered
significant consequences.164 In that study, researchers found that movements
as simple as attempting to irrigate crops were curtailed.165 Many young men
were farmers who were responsible for ensuring that their crops were
adequately irrigated. Because they shared an irrigation system, some farmers
were required to irrigate their crops at night to ensure that all farmers had
access to water. Because of the U.S. drone surveillance and strikes, young
farmers were no longer willing to move about at night because they were
required to use flashlights to operate the irrigation equipment and they feared
that the flashing lights might trigger a drone strike.166 Thus the drone program
affected something as basic as the ability to grow adequate crops. And the
effect was caused not by missile strikes alone but also by farmers' recognition
that their movements would be monitored and that the U.S. could move
quickly to strike once they observed seemingly anomalous behavior like a
flashlight beam in a field at night.
The U.S. drone program has affected movement in other ways as well.
In a separate study, based on structured interviews with local people living in
affected communities in Pakistan,167 researchers found that counterterrorism
operations, including surveillance and missile strikes, had significant
consequences for civilians.168 Because of the combined effects of
counterterrorism operations and militant attacks, places in Pakistan had
become untenable for civilians, displacing many families.169 U.S. drone
strikes appear to have affected the movement of public health workers
164

See Alex Edney-Browne, The Psychosocial Effects of Drone Violence: Social
Isolation, Self‐Objectification, and Depoliticization, 40 POL. PSYCH. 1341, 1343
(2019) (describing methodology of using structured interviews to discern the
effects of drone surveillance and drone strikes on the affected civilian population).
165
See id. at 1350 (describing issues with community irrigation scheme).
166
See id. at 1350-51 (describing effect of drone program on farmers' ability to use
irrigation system to full capacity).
167
See Aqil Shah, Do U.S. Drone Strikes Cause Blowback? Evidence from
Pakistan and Beyond, 42 INT'L SEC. 47, 54 (2018) (describing interview
methodology). The research question in Shah's study was whether U.S.
counterterrorism operations contributed to an increase in the number of people
who became militants or engaged in violence. Id. at 48-49. The study found that
U.S. operations did not appear to have this effect. Id. at 49. Most relevant for the
purposes of this Article is what else the study revealed, discussed above.
168
See id. at 54 (finding that "virtually every family" in the affected area had been
negatively affected by the conflict).
169
See id. at 56 (finding, based on interviews, that many civilians had experienced
some displacement as a result of militant attacks and counterterrorism operations).
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attempting to undertake a polio vaccination campaign in Pakistan during the
height of U.S. counterterrorism operations in that country, thereby disrupting
the public health campaign and hindering the eradication effort. 170 Although
the precise mechanism by which this occurred is difficult to discern, it
appears that at least part of the reason for the disruption was the difficulty
that public health workers had in moving around the country.171 Finally, a
report by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering
Terrorism found that counterterrorism practices have contributed to
"geographical restraints on movement" and "limitations on visits to houses of
worship," among other things.172
B. Disrupted Communication
One of the purposes of counterterrorism operations is to disrupt the
ability of militants to communicate with each other. The goal is to hinder their
ability to plan and execute militant attacks.173 These efforts also significantly
affect civilians as well. In the study based on interviews with Afghans living
in affected communities described above, researchers found that pervasive
surveillance was especially corrosive to communication among civilians.174
Researchers found that civilian fear of "drone surveillance provokes people
to self-police their behaviors and social activities," which has the effect of
devaluing "personal and socio-cultural traits previously valued in the

170

See Jonathan Kennedy, How Drone Strikes and a Fake Vaccination Program
Have Inhibited Polio Eradication in Pakistan: An Analysis of National Level Data,
47 INT'L J. HEALTH SERVS. 807, 819 (2017) (finding, based on empirical study,
that "drone strikes have disrupted polio eradication efforts in Pakistan").
171
See id. at 809 (describing difficulties in moving around the country as militants
responded to an increase in U.S. drone strikes).
172
See Fionnuala Ni Aolain (Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering
Terrorism), Human Rights Council (OHCHR), Human Rts. Impact of Counter
Terrorism & Countering (Violent) Extremism Pol’ys & Pracs. on the Rts. of
Women, Girls & the Fam., ¶ 25 U.N. Doc. A/HRC/46/36 (Jan. 22, 2021)
(describing effects of counterterrorism practices on civilians in affected areas).
173
See, e.g., Megan Smith & James Igoe Walsh, Do Drone Strikes Degrade Al
Qaeda? Evidence from Propaganda Output, 25 TERRORISM & POL.
VIOLENCE 311, 311-12 (2013) (describing U.S. strategy of using drone strikes to
degrade capacity of terrorist groups to communicate, plan, and organize their
operations).
174
Edney-Browne, supra note 164, at 1350.
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community."175 That occurred largely because "Afghan people are frequently
made to think about how they are perceived by Americans watching them
through drone surveillance cameras." 176 Even in-person communications and
socializing is curtailed.177 Neighbors are less willing to "cook dinners for one
another or stay over at a friend's or relative's house," a practice common when
community members lose a loved one.178
C. Erosion of Trust and Community Cohesion
The most profound effect of U.S. pervasive surveillance and missile
strikes—apart from civilian deaths—is likely the erosion of trust and
cohesion within communities. Perhaps most simply, living with the threat of
a drone strike or the knowledge that communications are monitored is
stressful. Researchers in the study examining the U.S. pervasive surveillance
and missile program in Pakistan described above found that, for people in
affected communities, "drones do indeed create stress and anxiety, especially
among children."179 Researchers for an advocacy group interviewed
community members in Pakistan who described their experiences witnessing
missile strikes and the deaths of their loved ones.180 Children and adults
described the trauma of seeing the deaths of family members and the way that
affected their ability to continue their lives in their villages. 181
There are a number of mechanisms by which trust and cohesion are
eroded. Part of the problem is that culturally-important rituals associated with
religious observance, marriage, mourning, and the like are curtailed by
pervasive surveillance and the threat of missile strikes. 182 Without such social
rituals, the social fabric of the community is weakened. Another part of the
175

Edney-Browne, supra note 164, at 1350
Edney-Browne, supra note 164, at 1350
177
Edney-Browne, supra note 164, at 1350 (finding that affected civilians had
reduced in-person communication and socializing).
178
Edney-Browne, supra note 164, at 1350
179
Shah, supra note 167, at 57.
180
See generally AMNESTY INT’L, "WILL I BE NEXT?" U.S. DRONE STRIKES IN
PAKISTAN (2013) (documenting civilian casualties from U.S. drone strikes in
Pakistan).
181
Id. at 18-23 (describing specific cases of missile strikes killing civilians and the
effects of such casualties).
182
Edney-Browne, supra note 164, at 1347 (finding that "fear of indiscriminate
bombing had also led to the avoidance and sometimes discontinuation of
communal activities and traditions. Festivities (such as Eid festival and wedding
parties), funerals, and local political meetings have been affected").
176
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problem is that ordinary, day-to-day socializing is greatly reduced, thereby
reducing opportunities for social support or trust-building. Researchers in
Afghanistan found that, in response to U.S. pervasive surveillance and
missile strikes, "young men in the community have stopped socializing
outside in the evenings" for fear of missile attack.183 Taken together, the
absence of these necessary components of social life erode community trust
and make the community itself weaker.
IV.

IMPLICATIONS

The implications of these findings for the legal assessment of U.S.
policy are significant. As the Biden Administration shapes its policies, it is in
a position that the Obama Administration was not: it has more evidence of
the real consequences of drone strikes on civilian populations in conflict
areas. The Biden Administration is also confronting a new threat landscape.
With the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, the U.S. is no longer able to use
conventional forces there. Instead, the U.S. will be relying on drones and
special operations forces as it does in Libya, Somalia, Syria, and
elsewhere.184 If the Biden Administration is as dedicated to complying with
international law as it has indicated, this new evidence should be cause for
reconsideration of using drones as a principal weapon in counterterrorism
operations when the targets are living among civilians.
But even with this new evidence, there are still significant issues
regarding the use of drones in counterterrorism operations. In this part, I
highlight three important issues. First, there is still no accepted definition of
what it means for a drone strike, or the strategy of using drones to target
suspected militants, to be "effective." Second, there is no convincing
evidence documenting the amount or types of adaptive behavior that militants
engage in. Put differently, information about a change in the frequency of
militant attacks after a missile strike does not provide any nuanced insight
into how militants have changed their behaviors. Third, there is no consensus
among policymakers about the kinds or amount of evidence necessary to
change policy. This means that some kinds of evidence, such as qualitative
reports about civilian experiences, are undervalued and other kinds of
183

Edney-Browne, supra note 164, at 1349.
Indeed, the U.S. launched a drone strike in Afghanistan as U.S. forces were
withdrawing. See Matthieu Aikins & Najim Rahim, Afghan Family Says Errant
U.S. Missile Killed 10, Including 7 Children, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2021
(describing U.S. air strike on vehicle erroneously suspected of containing a bomb
that resulted in civilian casualties).
184
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evidence, such as data about how often missiles hit their intended targets, are
overvalued.
It is perhaps surprising that almost 20 years into the post-9/11 era
there remains no consensus of understanding what it means for drone strikes
to be effective. There are at least three possible definitions, each of which can
find some support in reports and statements from policymakers and
advocates. First, some argue that drone strikes are effective because they kill
suspected militants or militant leaders. 185 This assertion certainly appears to
be true. For example, by one reliable estimate, more than 2,000 suspected
militants have been killed by drone strikes in Pakistan since the beginning of
counterterrorism operations.186 The same source estimates that more than
1,000 suspected militants have been killed in Yemen in the same time
period.187
That suspected militants are killed is surely true, but it is not the only
definition of effectiveness put forward by policymakers. Others argue that
drone strikes are meant to protect the U.S. homeland by eliminating potential
threats to it.188 This understanding of effectiveness relies on the assertion that
there have been no successful, externally-planned attacks on the U.S.
homeland since the 9/11 attacks. 189 The problem with this definition is that it
185

See generally Byman, supra note 101 (advancing various arguments in support
of drone strikes); President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the
National Defense University (May 23, 2013) (transcript available at Off. of the
Press Sec‘y) ("Dozens of highly skilled al Qaeda commanders, trainers, bomb
makers and operatives have been taken off the battlefield.")
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarkspresident-national-defense-university.
186
See Peter Bergen et al., America’s Counterterrorism Wars , NEW AMERICA
FOUNDATION (estimating 2366-3702 total deaths, with 245-303 being civilians)
https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/reports/americascounterterrorism-wars/the-drone-war-in-pakistan.
187
See id. (estimating 1378-1775 total deaths, with 115-149 being civilians)
188
See, e.g., President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on the
Administration’s Approach to Counterterrorism (Dec. 6, 2016), (noting that U.S.
counterterrorism strategy, including the use of drone strikes, was designed to
protect the U.S. homeland); David A. Jaeger & Zahra Siddique, Are Drone Strikes
Effective in Afghanistan and Pakistan? On the Dynamics of Violence Between the
United States and the Taliban, 4 CESIFO ECON. STUDIES 667, 668 (2018) (noting
that U.S. strategy is designed to protect the U.S. homeland and protect U.S. forces
stationed abroad).
189
See Cronin, supra note 101, at 48-49 (noting arguments by U.S. policymakers
that U.S. drone strikes have prevented militant attacks in the U.S.).
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asserts a causal relationship between drone strikes and a lack of attacks that
may have no basis in fact. There have been myriad changes in U.S. policies
to make it more difficult to travel to the U.S., communicate without detection,
provide financing to terrorists, or give any kind of support to suspected
terrorists.190 It is simply not credible to assert that drone strikes are effective
because there have not been attacks against the U.S. homeland.
Related to both of these issues lies a separate but equally important
problem. Most drone strikes in Pakistan and Afghanistan, where the most
strikes have been launched, appear to have targeted low-level militants. The
targets are not high-level planners or militants who are thought to be targeting
the U.S. Instead, they are mostly a threat to the countries in which they are
operating or to foreign troops (including U.S. troops) operating in those
places.191 Even assuming that killing suspected militants using drones has a
protective effect, it is not at all clear if the effect is to make the U.S. or
Waziristan safer.
The emerging evidence about drone strikes has revealed that
suspected militants make some changes to their behavior after the strikes, but
what is known about these behavioral changes is limited. There is some
evidence, for example, that militant attacks after drone strikes are less

190

See, e.g., WILLIAM J. KROUSE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42336, TERRORIST
WATCH LIST SCREENING AND BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR FIREARMS, 5-18,
(2013) (describing changes to U.S. gun laws and various watchlists); L EGAL
SIDEBAR: ANTI-TERRORIST/ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING INFORMATION-SHARING
BY FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS UNDER FINCEN’S REGULATIONS, CONG. RSCH.
SERV (2014) (https://sgp.fas.org/crs/terror/fincen.pdf) (describing Department of
Treasury’s financial crimes enforcement laws targeting terrorism financing);
EDWARD C. LIU, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44457, SURVEILLANCE OF FOREIGNERS
OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES UNDER SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT, (2016) (describing U.S. government powers
to monitor communications in counterterrorism programs).
191
See, e.g., Peter Bergen & Katherine Tiedemann, Washington’s Phantom War:
The Effects of the U.S. Drone Program in Pakistan, FOREIGN AFF. (July/Aug.
2011) https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/pakistan/2011-07-01/washingtonsphantom-war (reporting that the “majority of those killed” in drone strikes “are not
important insurgent commanders but rather low-level fighters”); Michael J. Boyle,
The Costs and Consequences of Drone Warfare, 89 INT’L AFF. 1, 7, 9 (2013)
(describing U.S. strikes against low-level militants, not those with greater
international capacity).
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targeted or focused.192 The evidence suggests that militants increase the
frequency of attacks on civilian targets—attacks which take less planning and
operational expertise—and decrease attacks on government targets or other
militants because of those attacks. 193 Although there is no direct evidence
suggesting why, researchers speculate that this may occur because attacks on
civilians are easier to carry out with minimal leadership and direction, while
attacks on hardened targets require more planning.194 Another example
comes from evidence that militant leaders might (or should be encouraged to)
modify their use of electronic communications after drone strikes. 195 Again,
there is no direct evidence of whether this happens, but one hypothesis is that
militants assume that their use of electronic communications makes them
easier to track and target.196 Whether these behavioral changes are actually
occurring is less important than the fact that policymakers and researchers do
not have a better understanding of the consequences of their actions. One of
the bedrock principles of international humanitarian law is military necessity,
which requires that attacks must be intended to defeat the adversary
militarily.197 Without a clear understanding of whether and how their attacks
affect their adversaries, the necessity analysis required by international
humanitarian law cannot be done.
A final issue raised by the new empirical studies is that there is no
agreed-upon standard of evidence necessary to change policy. This is not

192

See e,g,, Abrahms & Potter, supra note 12, at 328 (describing finding that after
a drone strike, militant groups may engage in “indiscriminate attacks” because of
the death of a militant leader).
193
See, e.g., Abrahms & Mierau, supra note 104, at 942 (finding an increase in
violence against civilians as a result of U.S.-led drone strikes because militant
groups become less discriminate in their attacks and redirect violence from
military to civilian targets).
194
See e.g., Abrahms & Potter, supra note 12, 329-31 (hypothesizing that increase
in indiscriminate attacks against civilians may be due to the difficulties of
attacking hardened military targets and the relative ease of attacking civilians).
195
Shah, supra note 167, at 56.
196
In fact, the U.S. was tracking mobile phones and using the location of the cell
phone for targeting. See PHILLIP BUMP, How the NSA is Using Cell Phone Data to
Drone Civilians (In Pakistan), THE ATLANTIC, July 22, 2013.
197
Christopher Greenwood, Historical Development and Legal Bases, in
HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN L. IN ARMED CONFLICTS, 1, 30-33, (Dieter Fleck
ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2nd ed. 1995) (describing the principle of military
necessity, including its limits).
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purely a problem of epistemology or other philosophical issues. 198 Instead it
is an evidence problem. The U.S. and its allies assert that their drone strikes
fully comply with the international humanitarian law principles of distinction,
necessity, and proportionality.199 These assertions continue no matter how
many civilians are killed and no matter what kind of evidence is presented to
challenge those assertions. Advocacy groups have long documented the
number of civilians killed by drone strikes. Although it is impossible to arrive
at a precise count, the number is in the thousands by most estimates.200
Human rights groups have compiled reports full of descriptions, based on
eyewitness accounts of survivors, of the devastating effects of drone strikes
on civilian populations.201 These effects include deaths, of course, but also
many other consequences such as disruptions in the daily lives of civilians,
198

See generally RICHARD RORTY, WHAT'S THE USE OF TRUTH? (2007) (arguing
that notions of "truth" are outmoded).
199
See Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, The Obama
Administration and International Law, Address at Annual Meeting of the
American Soc’y of Int'l L. (Mar. 25, 2010) (transcript available at U.S. Dep‘t of
State) (describing U.S. policy of complying with the international law of armed
conflict); Brian Egan, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, International Law, Legal
Diplomacy, and the Counter-ISIL Campaign, Address at the Annual Meeting of
the American Soc’y for Int’l L. (Apr. 1, 2016) (transcript available at U.S. Dep‘t of
State); Paul C. Ney, General Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Legal Considerations
Related to the U.S. Air Strike Against Qassem Soleimani, Address at B.Y.U L.
Sch. (Mar. 4, 2020).
200
The Bureau of Investigative Journalism maintains a comprehensive database of
casualties caused by drone strikes in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen.
See Drone Database, THE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM,
https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/projects/drone-war. The New America
Foundation maintains a similar database. See Peter Bergen et al., America's
Counterterrorism Wars, NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION,
https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/reports/americascounterterrorism-wars/. As of April 2021, the Bureau of Investigative Journalism's
database showed that there were between 4126-10,076 deaths from drone strikes in
Afghanistan, 2515-4026 deaths in Pakistan, 1197-1420 in Somalia, and 1020-1389
in Yemen. Drone Database, THE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM.
201
See, e.g., AMNESTY INT’L, THE HIDDEN US WAR IN SOMALIA: CIVILIAN
CASUALTIES FROM AIR STRIKES IN LOWER SHABELLE (2019) (describing effect on
civilians of U.S. drone strikes in Somalia); Edney-Browne, supra note 165, at 1341
(describing consequences of drone strikes and threat of drone strikes on civilians
living in high-risk areas); CENTER FOR CIVILLIANS IN CONFLICT, THE CIVILIAN
IMPACT OF DRONES: UNEXAMINED COSTS, UNANSWERED QUESTIONS (2012)
(describing effects on civilians of drone strikes, including lost loved ones,
disruptions to daily life, and increased anxiety among other effects).
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restrictions on travel, and the psychological effects of losing loved ones or
living in conflict zones. But none of this evidence appears to have had a
fundamental effect on U.S. policy. To be sure, the U.S. has reacted in some
ways. It has established a program allowing the U.S. to issue solatia
payments, meant as an expression of condolences for those whose loved ones
were killed by U.S. actions.202 And the U.S. has long argued that its weapons
are as precise as possible. But these arguments and responses miss the larger
point that there is no agreed-upon quantum or type of evidence that would
convince policymakers to make fundamental changes to policy.

202

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-07-299, THE DEP'T OF DEF.S USE OF
SOLATIA & CONDOLENCE PAYMENTS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN (2007).
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